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MAXIMIZING PASSENGER RECOVERY UNDER
THE WARSAW CONVENTION: ARTICLES
17 AND 22
The Warsaw Convention, was promulgated in 1929 to alleviate the
greatest problem confronting the emerging airline industry, the accu-
mulation of capital in the face of what were considered to be enor-
mous risks.2 To prevent air accidents from financially destroying the
young industry, the Convention limited both the circumstances
which could give rise to airline liability and the monetary amount of
such liability. Article 17,1 for example, provided that international
air carriers were liable for damages only when a passenger was killed
or injured as a result of an accident in an airplane or during the
process of embarking or disembarking. The carrier could avoid liabil-
The Warsaw Convention is officially known as the Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. 49 Stat. 3000,
T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11; reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS: DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 412-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LOWENFELD,
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT]; I Am LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3103 (Comm. Print 1965). The Convention was the product of two international
conferences, one held in Paris in 1925 and the other in Warsaw in 1929. The actual
drafting of the treaty was accomplished by the Comite International Technique
d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens. See Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the Inter-
national Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIR L. &
COM. 27 (1932). The United States did not participate in the work of the C.I.T.E.J.A.
or in the Warsaw Conference, but proclaimed adherence to the Convention in 1934
after the Senate ratification required by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. For
a general discussion of the Warsaw Convention, see L. KREINDLER, 1 AVIATION ACCIDENT
LAW, Ch. 11-12A (1974) [hereinafter cited as KREINDLER]; A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, VI-26-28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LOWENFELD];
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 497 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn].
I KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 11.01[2] at 11-2.
3 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES,
SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. G., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3-4 (1934), reprinted in Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 499-500. The statement emphasized that a limitation of
liability would aid international aviation by lowering carriers' insurance rates, with the
probable result that the operating costs of the carrier and the transportation charges
to passengers would be reduced. Id.
Article 17 provides that:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
See note 1 supra.
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ity entirely under Article 20(1) 5 by proving that the airline and its
agents used all due care in attempting to avoid the accident. Article
221 of the Covention placed a ceiling on the potential liability of the
carrier at approximately $8,300 per passenger. Since the signing of
the original treaty, however, the focus of air accident compensation
has shifted from the protection of the airline industry itself through
liability limitation, to the protection of airline passengers.' One man-
ifestation of this change, the Montreal Agreement, 8 raised the War-
saw liability limitation to $75,000 per passenger and waived the Arti-
cle 20(1) defense of due care up to the new liability ceiling 0 on inter-
Article 20(1) provides in part that "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves
that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that
it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." See note 1 supra.
I Article 22 provides in pertinent part that "In the transportation of passengers
the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000
francs." See note 1 supra. That sum was equal to approximately $8,300. Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 499. The Montreal Agreement of 1966 raised this mone-
tary limitation to the sum of $75,000. See text accompanying notes 7-8 infra.
I The most obvious change in air accident compensation involved the substantial
increase in the average amount recovered by airline accident victims. Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) statistics show that the average recovery between 1950 and 1964 for a
fatality in a Warsaw case was $6,489 as compared to $38,499 in a non-Warsaw case.
During the period of 1958 to 1964 the average recovery for a fatality in a non-Warsaw
case rose to $52,000. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 553-55. A more
subtle change occurred in the threshold determination of liability as a result of the
decline in importance of traditional concepts of negligence, and the concurrent rise of
various theories of liability without fault. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 75 (4th
ed. 1971); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). Cf. R. KEET'ON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION OF THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
(1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966).
I The Montreal Agreement is officially known as the Agreement Relating to Lia-
bility Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol. Agreement CAB
18900, approved by Exec. Order No. 23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966),
reprinted in LOWENFELD, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT supra note 1, at 434-35. The Mon-
treal Agreement was reached between the CAB and most of the major international
airlines after the State Department filed a notice of denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention on November 15, 1965, to take effect six months later unless the airlines
agreed to raise the liability limitations. The Agreement did not in any way alter the
language of the Warsaw Convention, but only waived certain provisions of the treaty.
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 551-52.
1 Agreement CAB 18900, approved by Exec. Order No. 23680, May 13, 1966, 31




national flights which include the United States as a point of arrival,
departure or stopover." Thus, the Montreal Agreement created a
system of strict liability up to $75,000 under the Warsaw Conven-
tion." The purpose of the Agreement was to provide increased protec-
tion to the international airline passenger within the framework of the
original Warsaw treaty.'
3
The safety of airline passengers has become increasingly tenuous
as the hazards of international air travel have grown to include politi-
cal terrorism, a danger not specifically addressed in the original
treaty.'4 The recent rise of terrorism in conjunction with international
"Id.
,2 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 12B.02[3] at 12B-7.
' Shortly after the Montreal Agreement was reached the CAB indicated that the
primary objective of the agreement was to give more realistic compensation to interna-
tional airline passengers. This CAB statement evidenced the transition from the origi-
nal Warsaw goal of airline protection to a new objective of increased passenger protec-
tion. See CAB Press Release 66-61, 382-6031 May 13, 1966; reprinted in KREINDLER,
supra note 1, § 12A.07[3], at 12A-13.
11 Although airline liability for acts of terrorism is not specifically mentioned in
the Warsaw Convention, Article 21 provides that "if the carrier proves that the damage
was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court may,
in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly
from his liability." See note 1 supra. Thus, a terrorist or saboteur could not recover
under the Convention.
The Montreal Agreement did not alter the effect of Article 21. See Approval of
CAB Agreement 18900, Exec. Order No. 23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966),
reprinted in KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 12A.06, at 12A-9, stating that nothing in the
Agreement affected the rights and liabilities of the carrier with regard to any claim
brought by or on behalf of one who has wilfully caused injury to passengers. The reason
for this is that "those guilty of sabotage and those persons claiming on their behalf
will not be able to recover any damages." 54 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 955, 956 (1966). Since
sabotage has been equated with terrorism, see 70 AM. JUR. 2d Sedition § 6 (1973),
presumably all terrorists are also unable to recover under the Convention. The specific
exclusion from recovery of those wilfully causing injury to passengers raises the infer-
ence that the victims of such conduct are able to recover under the treaty. See Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d
1240 (2d Cir. 1973). See note 62 infra. But cf. Hernandez v. Air France, No. 7631146
(1st Cir. Nov. 19, 1976). The court denied recovery to the victims of a terrorist attack
which occurred in an airport baggage claim area. The First Circuit stated that the
attack in the airport, unlike an airplane hijacking, could have taken place in any public
building and therefore was not covered by the Warsaw Convention which permits
recovery only for injuries resulting from the characteristic risks of air travel. Id. slip
op. at 8-9. This distinction is questionable in light of the Convention's failure to limit
recoverable injuries to those incurred as a result of aviation-related risks. See note 4
supra. The concurring opinion in Hernandez pointed out that a terrorist attack in an
airport should be subjected to the same analysis under the Convention as an airplane
hijacking. Such an attack is a hazard of modem air travel if it occurs "in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking" under the terms of Article 17.
1977]
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flight 5 illustrates the necessity of liberal treaty construction to allow
passengers to recover for injuries resulting from acts of terrorism.
Such construction allows the Convention to remain sufficiently plia-
ble to encompass all of the modem risks of aviation. 6 This needed
flexibility can be attained only by interpreting the Warsaw Conven-
tion in view of its modern purposes, rather than acceding to the
outdated goals of another era. 7 Two cases involving terrorist activity,
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.'8 and Reed v. Wiser,"' illuminated
Hernandez v. Air France, slip op. at 11 n. 2 (1st Cir. Nov. 19, 1976) (McEntee, J.
concurring).
" Until a few years ago unlawful interference with aircraft was not a common
occurrence, Recently, however, such activity has ranged from the temporary seizure
of an aircraft and its passengers to the murder of passengers and complete destruction
of aircraft. See Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21
BUFFALO L. REv. 339, 340 (1971).
t" See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973), (hijacking was an "accident" under Article
17 of the Convention). See also note 62 infra.
"1 A basic tenet of treaty interpretation is that the conduct of the parties after the
conclusion of a treaty (often called practical construction) should be analyzed in deter-
mining the proper construction to be given an international agreement. L. McNAIR,
THE LAW OF TREATIES 424 (1961) [hereinafter cited as McNAIR]; I. BROWNLIE, PmNCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 608 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE].
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 32, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 39/27 May
23, 1969, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT. L. 875, 885 (1969); 8 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS 679
(1969) [hereinafter cited as the Vienna Convention]. (The Vienna Convention was
signed on behalf of the United States on April 24, 1970, but it has not been ratified by
the Senate. For a history of the Convention, see S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION (1970).) BROWNLIE,
supra, at 608 states that the subsequent practice of the individual parties is of proba-
tive value in treaty construction. Thus, the Montreal Agreement, even though involv-
ing only one party to the original treaty (the United States), may nonetheless illumi-
nate the modem purposes of the Warsaw Convention.
"' 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970) (federal question jurisdiction arising under a treaty of the United States when
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diver-
sity of citizenship jurisdiction when amount in controversy exceeds the sum of
$10,000). In addition, Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides in part for
jurisdiction in the courts of the carrier's domicile, principal place of business, or place
of business where the parties entered into the contract of carriage. See note 1 supra.
" 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 76-7247 (2d Cir. May 27,
1976) Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction when amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000), 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970) (admiralty jurisdiction), and 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970) (Death on the High Seas
Act). The Death on the High Seas Act provides for admiralty jurisdiction where the
death of a person is caused by negligence occurring on the high seas more than a marine
league (three miles) from the United States or its territories. The incident on which
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respectively the modem meaning of Article 17,0 which generally de-
fines the circumstances which may give rise to airline liability, and
Article 22,2! which provides for a monetary limitation of air carrier
liability. The cornerstone of both decisions is the premise that the
Warsaw Convention must be construed so as to accomplish its mod-
em function of passenger protection.
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.2 arose from a terrorist attack
in an airport in Athens, Greece. Two Palestinian guerrillas threw
hand grenades and fired machine guns into a line of passengers wait-
ing to board a Trans World Airlines (T.W.A.) flight to New York.3
At the time of the attack, the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' decedents were
standing in a line at the airline departure gate to which a T.W.A.
representative had summoned them. Prior to being directed to the
departure gate, the passengers had been required to sit in the transit
lounge, an area reserved for passengers on international flights, until
instructed to proceed to the departure gate to be searched by Greek
policemen. During the search the terrorists attacked those passengers
still standing in line. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant air-
line was liable under Article 172 of the Warsaw Convention because
the passengers sustained their injuries in the course of the operations
of embarking.8 T.W.A., however, contended that the operations of
embarking could not include any passenger activity within the ter-
minal building.27 The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the airline's
Reed was based led to a number of suits in various federal courts, all of which were
consolidated in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for pretrial
proceedings pursuant to an order of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel. In re Air Crash
In the Ionian Sea, 407 F. Supp. 238 (J.P.M.L. 1974). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970), a
Multidistrict Litigation Panel, consisting of seven circuit and district judges, no two
of whom may be from the same circuit, has the power to transfer civil actions in
different districts, involving common questions of fact, to any district for consolidated
pretrial proceedings. Such a transfer is made for the convenience of the parties and
the facilitation of the proceedings. Id. The transfer occurs most often in private
antitrust actions and air catastrophe suits. McDermott, The Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215, 219 n.19 (1973). For a critical analysis of multidis-
trict litigation in aviation disaster cases, see Martin, Multidistrict Litigation-A Pana-
cea or a Blight, 18 TRIAL LAW GuMs 409 (1975). For recommended improvements of
the transfer process, see Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases,
38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 159 (1972).
20 See note 4 supra.
1 See note 6 supra.
2 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
23 Id. at 32.
21 Id.
21 See note 4 supra.
" 528 F.2d at 33.
v Id.
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argument, and affirmed the decision of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York' s in holding that since the passengers
were under the control of the airline at the time of the assault, they
were in the course of embarking within the meaning of Article 17.9
To reach this controlled activity test, the Day court first examined
the language of the treaty to determine the scope of the phrase "oper-
ations of embarking" in Article 17.10 The court observed that the
French word "operation", contained in the official text of the Coven-
tion, is defined as a process composed of many acts. 3' As the court
noted, this definition focuses on an activity without any reference to
geographical limitation, and therefore in a determination of the scope
of "operations of embarking" the actions of the passenger rather than
his location should be analyzed.2 Although this textual search for the
meaning of "operations of embarking" indicated that the applicabil-
ity of the phrase depended on the passenger's activity at the time of
the accident, 31 the definition of the phrase at issue failed to delineate
precisely which of the many acts of the departing passenger were
within the process of embarking.
34
2' Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29 528 F.2d at 33-34.
Id. In looking first to the language of the treaty, the Day court complied with
the most fundamental principle of treaty construction, that international agreements
should be interpreted primarily on the basis of the plain meaning of their texts. Only
if language of the treaty is obscure or ambiguous should supplementary methods of
interpretation be used. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 607; I. TAMMELO, TREATY INTERPRE-
TATION AND PRACTICAL REASON 14-15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAMMELO]; The Vi-
enna Convention, supra note 17, Art. 31. But this rule of interpretation is merely a
starting point and should not be allowed to obscure the ultimate goal of treaty interpre-
tation, which is to determine the intention of the contracting parties as reflected in
the language used in the treaty. McNAIR, supra note 17, at 366.
1, 528 F.2d at 33 n.7. The appellee passengers also noted that "embarking" has
been defined as causing to go aboard a vessel. Brief for Appellee Kersen at 9, Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975); Brief for Appellee Day at 15,
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
32 528 F.2d at 33.
3 Id.
31 As T.W.A. argued, reliance on the plain meaning of "operations of embarking"
is probably inappropriate in Day since there is no single interpretation which may be
given to the phrase. The crucial language of Article 17 is so vague as to be subject to
both broad and narrow construction and hence has no plain meaning. See Brief for
Appellant at 36, Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975). One
commentator has noted that the "operations of embarking" phrase in Article 17 illus-
trates an inherent difficulty in freezing into words the exact limits of a law. He argued
that the airline should be liable only for injuries resulting from dangers peculiar to
aviation, and therefore should not be liable under the Convention in its capacity as a
waiting-room proprietor. See Hernandez v. Air France, No. 76-1146 (1st Cir. Nov. 19,
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Since the "operations of embarking" language of Article 17 is
sufficiently broad to be subject to a variety of interpretations,7 the
Day court reviewed the legislative history of the article for evidence
of the intended scope of "operations of embarking."36 The court noted
that the original draft37 of Article 17 provided for airline liability from
the time passengers entered the departure airport until they left the
arrival airport." After much debate at the Warsaw Conference, this
proposal was rejected and the present language of Article 17 was
adopted.39 There are two possible interpretations of this rejection
which would lead to opposite results in Day. First, as T.W.A. argued,
the dissatisfaction with the proposed language might be indicative of
the Warsaw delegates' intent that the airlines be free from liability
for any accidents occurring in the terminal building. Thus, airline
1976). (In Hernandez, the First Circuit stated that recovery under the Warsaw Conven-
tion should depend on a close logical nexus between the passenger's injury and the
characteristic risks of air travel. Id. slip op. at 10.) The same commentator did,
however, recognize the need for broad language in Article 17 which would allow for
application of the treaty to widely varying fact situations. Sullivan, The Codification
of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 20-21 (1936).
But cf. Heller, Notes on the Proposed Revision of Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 20 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 142, 146-48 (1971). (The author argued that a clear defini-
tion of "operations of embarking" is needed in Article 17 to insure uniform judicial
interpretation.)
See note 34 supra.
Z, Where the language employed in a treaty is unclear, recourse may be had to
other means of interpretation, such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances surrounding its conclusion. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 608; TAMMELO,
supra note 30, at 15; Vienna Convention, supra note 17, Art. 32. International and
national tribunals have freely used evidence of preliminary negotiations to determine
the meaning of terms used by contracting parties in treaties. Y-T CHANG, THE INTER-
PRETATION OF TREATIES BY JUDIcIAL TRIBUNALS 140 (2d ed. 1968).
31 The original proposal for Article 17 was made by a committee of experts in
aviation law (C.I.T.E.J.A.) appointed to submit a draft for consideration by the dele-
gates at the Warsaw Conference. See note 1 supra.
31 H Conference Internationale de Droit Prive Aerien 171 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as the Warsaw Minutes], translated in Brief for Appellant at 13, Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
3, Warsaw Minutes- supra note 38, at 57.
' To support the argument that the rejection of the original draft of Article 17
indicated that terminal building accidents were excluded, T.W.A. pointed out that
Article 18 which relates to airline liability for damage to goods and baggage, specifi-
cally provides for liability during the period in which "the goods or baggage are in
charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board an aircraft." See note 1 supra.
T.W.A. contended that this express reference to carrier liability in the airport and the
absence of such language in Article 17 signified the intent of the drafters of the Conven-
tion that there be no liability for accidents which occur in the air terminal building.
Brief for Appellant at 16-18, Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1977]
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liability would depend entirely on the location of the passenger at the
time of the accident, and since the plaintiffs in Day were still in the
terminal building at the time of the terrorist attack, T.W.A. would
be free from liability. Conversely, the rejection of the original pro-
posal might indicate the delegates' intent to avoid a test of liability
based strictly on passenger location, and to allow for application of
the treaty to widely dissimilar circumstances through the use of
broad language." Thus, airline liability under this analysis would
depend primarily upon the activity of the passenger, rather than
solely upon his location. The Second Circuit adopted this second
interpretation of the Convention's legislative history, and inferred
from the delegates' rejection of blanket airline liability in the ter-
minal building only that there are some airport accidents for which
the airline should not be held liable.4 2 The general determination by
the Day court that some accidents in the air terminal building may
result in airline liability,43 did not resolve the question of precisely
which airport accidents are within the ambit of the Convention. How-
ever, the court's conclusion from the legislative history of Article 17
that there may be airline liability for some accidents in the airport,"
did support its conclusion from the treaty's text that the proper test
of coverage under "operations of embarking" should not be based
simply on whether the passenger was injured inside or outside the
terminal building.45
1975). No reference, however, was made to this difference in language in the briefs of
the appellees or the opinion of the Second Circuit. One reply to T.W.A.'s argument is
that the language of Article 18 makes the airline liable only when the goods or baggage
are damaged while "in [the] charge of the carrier," and that the "operations of
embarking" language of Article 17 has the similar effect of imposing liability on the
carrier only when passengers are injured while in the charge of the airline. The differ-
ence in the terminology of Articles 17 and 18 may be explained by the fact that the
air carrier is typically in complete physical control of goods and baggage while it
customarily exerts a lesser degree of control over passengers through the use of verbal
directions in the process of embarking and disembarking.
' 528 F.2d at 35.
,I Id. at 35 n.12. For a discussion of the problems inherent in attempting to discern
legislative intent based only on the rejection of a past practice or proposal by a law-
making body, see note 87 infra.
,1 528 F.2d at 35.
I d.
' The court's conclusion, based on the legislative history of Article 17, that a
"strict location" test of airline liability is inappropriate accords with its analysis of the
Article's text. See text accompanying note 33, supra. On the basis of the court's textual
and historical analysis, T.W.A. arguably erred in relying on the overbroad assertion
that the airline may not be held liable for any passenger injury which occurs within
the limits of the air terminal. See Brief for Appellant at 22-34, Day v. Trans World
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In an attempt to determine which passenger activities are covered
by Article 17, the Second Circuit turned to the Montreal Agreement
as evidence of the goals currently shared by the parties to the Conven-
tion. " The court noted that the Montreal provisions for strict airline
liability and their substantially increased liability limitation indicate
that the present function of the Convention is to protect passengers
from the hazards of international air travel." The court further em-
phasized that the strict liability provisions of the Agreement accord
with modern concepts of accident cost allocation." This rationale of
extensive passenger protection, as manifested in the strict liability
provisions of the Montreal Agreement, supports the liberal construc-
tion of Article 17 in Day.4" Since the passengers were in the transit
lounge and standing in line at the departure gate at the specific
direction of T.W.A.,5 the airline, by exercising this control, created
certain risks for the passengers.5 The costs of accidents resulting from
such risks arguably should be allocated to the airline so that it bears
the full cost of its economic activity.5 Hence, the Second Circuit, in
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975). T.W.A. could have made the narrower
argument that even under a controlled activity test, the control of T.W.A. over the
passengers in the transit lounge was not sufficient for coverage under Article 17 since
the lounge was used by all departing passengers scheduled for the international flights
of some forty airlines, not just those of T.W.A. Brief for Appellant at 5, Day v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
" See note 17 supra.
' 528 F.2d at 36-37. See note 9 supra.
528 F.2d at 34. Since accidents and injuries are characteristics of every business
activity, if an enterprise is forced to pay for its accidents as it pays for its other
expenses, it will experience market pressure to reduce accident costs through the
implementation of safety measures. Under traditional negligence theory, however, an
activity is largely relieved of this market pressure because it pays for its accidents only
to the extent that the standard of due care has not been met. Forcing the enterprise
to bear the accident costs of its operation discourages all accidents, not just those in
which due care was not exercised. Onek, The Montreal Agreement and Enterprise
Liability, Symposium on the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. &CoM. 603, 605 (1967).
11 See Sand, Risk in the Air and the Myth of Fault, Symposium on the Warsaw
Convention, 33 J. Am L. & COM. 594, 600-02 (1967).
528 F.2d at 31-32.
5 Such risks are recognized at common law, where the carrier owes its passengers
a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the station facilities at the airport safe. See,
e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Bonilla Colon, 392 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1968); Polera v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 284 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960); City of Knoxville v. Bailey, 222 F.2d
520 (6th Cir. 1955). Cf. Garrett v. American Airlines, Inc., 332 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964),
(airline was held to a standard of the highest degree of care during the entire passenger-
carrier relationship including the time that the passenger spent on station premises.)
The district court in Day placed considerable emphasis on the common law rule
concerning airline liability for accidents in the terminal building. See 393 F. Supp. at
19771
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determining which passenger activities were within the scope of "op-
erations of embarking," included those activities of the passenger
which were controlled by the carrier and therefore were subject to the
risks engendered by the airline's business activity."
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Evangelinos v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.54 held on the basis of Day that accidents occurring within
the terminal building are not excluded from Article 17 coverage."'
Evangelinos is particularly important in any consideration of Day
because the two cases were based on the same terrorist attack. The
Third Circuit in Evangelinos compared the "controlled activity" test
of the Second Circuit in Day with the "strict location" test employed
in Evangelinos by the District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania,"6 and found the "controlled activity" test superior due to its
flexibility in application to the modem hazards of air travel. 57 Based
on this test, the Third Circuit in Evangelinos determined that by
confining the passengers to the transit lounge, announcing the de-
parting flight, and directing the passengers to stand near the depar-
ture gate, the airline had assumed responsibility for the passengers,
and therefore the passengers were engaged in the "operations of em-
barking." '58 The court buttressed its broad construction of Article 17
by citing the discussion in Day of the modem function of the Warsaw
Convention to provide increased protection to international airline
passengers. 9
223. Likewise, on appeal, the plaintiffs urged this common law analogy to the Warsaw
Convention. See Brief for Appellee Kersen at 16-17, Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless the Second Circuit in Day made no reference
to the common law of air carrier liability, presumably because the case was governed
by an international treaty which should be interpreted primarily on the basis of its
text, not on the basis of other bodies of law. See generally note 30 supra.
' See note 48 supra.
528 F.2d at 33.
51 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, [1976] Av. L. REP. (CCH) (14 Av. Cas.)
17,101 (3d Cir. May 4, 1976), petition for rehearing en banc granted, June 3, 1976.
[1976] Av. L. REP. (CCH) (14 Av. Cas.) 17,101 (3d Cir. May 4, 1976).
396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
See [1976] Av. L. REP. (CCH) (14 Av. Cas.) 17,102-03 (3d Cir. May 4, 1976).
Id. at 17,102. The result in Evangelinos and Day is supported by Blumenfeld
v. British European Airways, Inc., 11 Z.L.W. 78 (Ct. App. Berlin 1962) cited at 528
F.2d at 37 n.17. In Blumenfeld, the court found the air carrier liable for the injury of a
passenger who fell down a staircase on his way from the airline waiting hall to the
airplane. The German court held that the Convention applied because the air carrier
had committed the passengers to its care when they were directed by an airline repre-
sentative to go from the waiting room to the aircraft.
5' The analysis by the Evangelinos court of the current expectations of the parties
to the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement was the crucial
WARSAW CONVENTION RECOVERY
Throughout the United States there has been a similar tendency
to construe the Warsaw Convention broadly to allow recovery where
it might be denied under a narrower interpretation."0 The courts of
the Second Circuit initiated the trend of liberal construction to pre-
vent inadequate recoveries, particularly in cases involving the
difference between the rationale of the Third Circuit and that of the district court. In
holding that Article 17 does not apply to passengers inside the terminal building, the
district court in Evangelinos seemingly neglected any analysis of the modern purposes
of the Warsaw Convention. See 396 F. Supp. 95. By ignoring the changes made in the
Convention since 1929 that greatly increased the protection of international airline
passengers, the district court ignored one of the most basic cannons of treaty construc-
tion. That principle dictates that the conduct of the contracting parties subsequent to
the conclusion of a treaty should be considered as evidence of the mutual goals of the
parties with respect to the agreement. See note 17 supra. Consideration of the empha-
sis on passenger protection in the Montreal Agreement as conduct subsequent to the
original treaty is therefore necessary in any complete analysis of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. As the district court in Evangelinos noted, the Montreal Agreement did not
amend any of the Convention's original terms, but only waived the Article 20(1) due
care defense and the Article 22 recovery ceiling of $75,000. 396 F. Supp. at 100. How-
ever, the fact that the Agreement failed to change the actual text of the Convention
does not mean that it is without interpretative value. The Montreal Agreement was
the result of changing attitudes toward both air accident compensation, see note 7
supra, and the airline industry itself. LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at VI-88-89, 95-96. In
the interim between Warsaw and Montreal, the airline industry had enjoyed phenome-
nal growth and was no longer in need of special protection from extensive liability. Id.
As a result of these changes, the parties to the Montreal Agreement stressed protection
of the passenger rather than the airline. See note 13 supra. The general shift in empha-
sis from airline protection to passenger protection exhibited in the Montreal Agree-
ment is valuable in analyzing the Warsaw Convention, even if the language of the
original treaty remained intact.
The opinions of the Second Circuit in Day and the Third Circuit in Evangelinos,
with their careful examination of the modern purposes of the Convention as modified
by the Montreal Agreement, clarified the scope of "operations of embarking" while the
defective treaty interpretation in the opinion of the district court in Evangelinos only
obscured the meaning of the phrase at issue.
11 Under Article 25 of the Convention, proof of wilful misconduct on the part of
the airline or its employees allows a plaintiff to recover unlimited damages against the
airline. See note 75 infra. There is evidence of a trend toward liberal treatment of
Article 25. Compare Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956) (affirming judgment in favor of airline on issue of wilful
misconduct in unexplained accident case) with Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac.
Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965) and LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965) (both refusing to overturn jury determinations of wilful
misconduct on part of airlines or employees in similar cases in which the cause of the
air crashes was not known). See also Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804
(2d Cir. 1966), broadly construing Article 28(1), which provides for jurisdiction where
the carrier has a place of business at which the parties entered into the contract of
carriage, so that the plaintiff could bring suit in the United States.
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interpretation of Article 17. In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,'
which involved the hijacking by an Arabian terrorist group of a
Zurich-to-New York flight, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that the hijacking was an "accident" within
the ambit of Article 17.12 Consideration of the Montreal Agreement
and its strict liability provisions was central to the Husserl decision
as evidence of the current expectations of the parties to the original
Convention that international airline passengers receive increased
protection through allocation of air travel costs to the airlines.63 The
court also concluded, on the basis of the modern purpose of the
treaty, that mental and psychosomatic injuries are colorably within
the scope of Article 17.4 Husserl illustrates the willingness of the
61 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Husserl 1]. For a discussion of Husserl I, see Note, 39 J. AIR L.
& Cort. 445 (1973).
62 351 F. Supp. at 707. The Husserl I court conceded that hijacking was probably
not considered by the drafters of the Convention, but noted that under Article 21 the
only passengers excluded from recovery by the treaty were those guilty of wilful mis-
conduct. From this express exclusion the court inferred that innocent passengers in-
jured by the wilful misconduct of another would be able to recover. Id. at 706-07. See
note 14 supra. Presumably in order to alleviate the need for such an inference, the
Guatemala City Protocol, a treaty drafted to replace the Warsaw Convention and its
progeny, substituted the word "event" for the word "accident" in Article 17. The
Guatemala City Protocol was signed by the United States in 1971, but has not been
approved by the Senate, and therefore is not law in the United States. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2. The Guatemala City Protocol is officially known as the Protocol to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the
Hague on 28 September 1955. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc.
No. 8932 (1971), reprinted in 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 555 (1971); LOWENFELD, DOcUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 437. For a full discussion of the Guatemala City Protocol
see KREINDLER, supra note 1, at Ch. 12B; Note, The Guatemala City Protocol to the
Warsaw Convention and the Supplemental Plan Under Article 35-A: A Proposal to
Increase Liability and Establish a No-Fault System for Personal Injuries and Wrongful
Death in International Aviation, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT. L. & POL. 312 (1972).
63 351 F. Supp. at 707.
" 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1248-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Husserl Ill.
Husserl I, in denying the airline's first motion for summary judgment, reached only
the issue of whether a hijacking is an "accident" under Article 17. In Husserl II, the
court considered the airline's second motion for summary judgment based primarily
on the contention that the plaintiff's mental injuries were not covered by the Warsaw
Convention. The court denied the motion and held that mental anguish is within the
ambit of "bodily injury" in Article 17. The court stated that "bodily injury" should
be construed expansively to encompass as many kinds of injuries as are colorably
within the scope of Article 17, although the draftsmen of the Convention probably did
not consider the coverage of mental injuries. Id. at 1250. The court further stated that
mental suffering, absent any physical manifestation of such injury, is compensable if
WARSAW CONVENTION RECOVERY
Second Circuit and the Southern District of New York to interpret
the articles of the Warsaw Convention to allow recovery to injured
airline passengers."
the otherwise applicable substantive law provides a cause of action for mental anguish
alone. Id. at 1251. But cf. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152
(D.N.M. 1973) (only emotional distress directly resulting from some physical injury is
compensable). Id. at 1158; Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 358
N.Y.S.2d 97, 314 N.E.2d 848 (1974) (physical injury resulting from the mental anguish
caused by an accident is compensable, but mental suffering alone is not recoverable).
34 N.Y.2d at 397-99, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107-09, 314 N.E.2d 855-56.
For a consideration of the interrelationship of Husserl II, Burnett, and Rosman,
see Note, Air Law-Warsaw Convention-Mental Anguish Alone is a Compensable
Injury under Article 17-Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), 7 S.TON HALL L. REv. 108 (1975). The Guatemala City Protocol
substituted the term "personal injuries" for "bodily injuries," presumably to insure
that mental anguish would be compensable. See note 62 supra.
0 In a case involving airline liability for injuries suffered by disembarking passen-
gers, however, the District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
extend its usually broad interpretation of Article 17. The court in Felismina v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., [1974] Av. L. REP. (CCH) [13 Av. Cas.] 17,145 (S.D.N.Y.
June 24, 1974), refused to apply Article 17 coverage to a passenger who had fallen down
an escalator in the terminal building on her way to the baggage claim area. This
narrow interpretation of the scope of Article 17 allowed the plaintiff to avoid the Article
29 two-year limitation for actions brought under the Convention. The court in a very
brief opinion stated only that the passenger had completed the process of disembarking
by the time she had reached the escalator in the air terminal building. Id. By referring
in its holding to the escalator as a specific point within the airport, the court appeared
to be employing a strict location test in the determination of liability. Likewise, the
First Circuit in MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971), held that a
passenger injured while waiting in the baggage pickup area could not recover under
Article 17 since she had reached a safe point inside the terminal. See Klein v. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 App. Div. 2d 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1974), holding that a
passenger who had arrived safely within the terminal building had disembarked under
the terms of Article 17 before he was injured by a baggage conveyor belt. Id. The
MacDonald court refused to state at what point the disembarkation process was com-
pleted, but indicated that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to passengers far
removed from the operation of the aircraft. 439 F.2d at 1405. MacDonald, like
Felismina, placed little emphasis on the activity of the passenger at the time of the
accident, but rather stressed only the plaintiff's location when he was injured. Id. at
1402, 1405. Why a location test is used in the disembarkation cases of Felismina and
MacDonald while a controlled activity test is employed in decisions involving embar-
kation is not clear. Under a controlled activity test the results in Felismina and
MacDonald would not be changed, since in neither case were the plaintiffs acting
under the specific instructions of airline personnel as were the passengers in Day. See
Hernandez v. Air France, No. 76-1146 (1st Cir. Nov. 19, 1976). Hernandez involved a
terrorist attack on newly arrived passengers waiting to pick up their luggage in the
baggage claim area of the terminal building. The First Circuit employed a controlled
activity test and held that the injured passengers were not disembarking within the
scope of Article 17. The court distinguished Hernandez from Day and Evangelinos on
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As in Husserl and Day, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Reed v. Wiser,"6 construing Article 22, relied on
an analysis of the policy considerations supporting the modern Con-
vention. 7 In 1974, a T.W.A. flight from Athens, Greece crashed in the
Ionian Sea. All passengers aboard the aircraft were killed. The heirs,
next of kin, and personal representatives of nine of the decedents
brought suit against the president and security vice president of
T.W.A. The complaint alleged that the crash was due to a bomb
explosion on board the aircraft, and that the two defendants, in their
respective capacities at T.W.A., were responsible for the installation
and maintenance of a security system designed to prevent the placing
of explosives on company aircraft. 8 The complaint further alleged
that the defendants' failure to install or maintain a satisfactory secu-
rity system was the proximate cause of the accident. 9 The defendants
the basis that the baggage retrieval process in Hernandez was not characterized by
airline control of a segregated group of passengers. Unlike the Day plaintiffs, the
injured passengers in Hernandez appeared to be free agents acting of their own volition
without interference from airline employees. Id. slip op. at 6. But see Mache v. Air
France [19671 Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien 343, (Cour d'appel, Rouen 1967), affd
[1970], Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien 311 (Cass. 1970). In Mache, a passenger was
injued while being helped to the terminal building by two stewardesses. The passenger
was directed off the main walkway to the airport due to construction and fell into a
manhole. The court held that the Convention would apply only if the passenger had
been injured on the designated pathway to the terminal building, [19671 Revue Fran-
caise de Droit Aerien 343, 345 (Cour d'appel Rouen 1967). Mache represents the strict
location test taken to its extreme. The opposite result would follow from a control test,
since the passenger was being physically assisted by two airline representatives at the
time of the accident. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra. The Mache result also
seems incorrect under the location test of MacDonald and Felismina since the passen-
ger had not yet reached the safety of the terminal building. Unlike the injured passen-
ger in Mache, most disembarking passengers typically are not under the physical
control of airline representatives. The process of retrieving luggage from the baggage
claim area, during which the plaintiffs in MacDonald, Felismina, and Hernandez were
injured, is not a requirement imposed by the airline on disembarking passengers. 393
F. Supp. at 223-24. The procedure for boarding aircraft, on the other hand, involves a
series of steps which are very carefully controlled by the airline. Id. at 221. This
element of airline supervision in the boarding process distinguishes Day from the
disembarkation cases, but does not explain why the courts in Felismina and
MacDonald used a location test when a controlled activity test would have yielded the
same result. See Hernandez v. Air France, No. 76-1146 (1st Cir. Nov. 19, 1976). Since
operations of embarking and disembarking are both provided for in Article 17, the
same test should be applied to determine which passenger activities fall within the
language of the Article.
'6 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).




asserted that their potential liability was limited to $75,000 per pas-
senger by the terms of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention as
modified by the Montreal Agreement." In Reed, the issue addressed
was whether the Convention's liability limitation applies only to the
corporate air carrier or also serves to protect employees of the carrier
from liability for unlimited damages.7 ' The Reed court held that the
liability limitation provision of the treaty72-does not limit the liability
of employees of the carrier.
7 3
The analysis in Reed, as in Day, focused on the text, legislative
history, and purposes of the modem Warsaw Convention. To deter-
mine whether Article 22 limited the liability of airline employees, the
court first searched the text of the Convention for a workable defini-
tion of "carrier." 4 The Reed court noted that there was evidence of
a distinction between the corporate carrier and its employees in Arti-
cle 2511 and Article 20(1) .71 Article 25 specifically deals with the wilful
misconduct of both the airline and its agents while Article 20(1)
7' Id. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
7, Id. Generally, an agent is not relieved of liability for his torts because he was
acting on behalf of a principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1957). An
agent who undertakes some action for his principal to protect third parties is subject
to liability to third parties for physical harm caused by the reliance of the principal or
third party on the agent's undertaking and his subsequent failure to act, if such failure
creates an unreasonable risk of harm. Id. § 354.
72 See note 6 supra.
' The Reed court refused to rule on the issue raised by the defendants as to
whether they could be held liable for nonfeasance as well as malfeasance until it was
determined whether New York law would govern the liability of the defendants as
officers of T.W.A. New York maintains a distinction between the nonfeasance and
malfeasance of corporate agents, a distinction which has disappeared in New Jersey,
the plaintiffs' state of residence. 414 F. Supp. at 869-70.
11 Id. at 864-65. For a discussion of textual analysis in treaty construction, see note
30 supra.
15 414 F. Supp. at 864-65. Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides in perti-
nent part:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage
is caused by his wilful misconduct....
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
See note 1 supra. See also Pratt, Carriage by Air Act-Limitation of Air Carrier's
Liability- Whether Servants of Carrier Also Protected, 41 CAN. B. REv. 124, 128
(1963).
1, See note 5 supra. Both the airline and its agents must use due care in avoiding
injury to the passenger. This defense of due care is waived under the Montreal Agree-
ment. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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concerns the defenses of both the carrier and its agents. An inference
might be drawn from these provisions specifically dealing with carrier
employees that the absence of such language in Article 22 indicates
that the drafters of the Convention did not intend to extend liability
limitation to agents of the airlines. The Reed court, however, refused
to apply this inference to support its result, and stated only that there
was no conclusive evidence that the scope of the word "carrier" in
Article 22 was addressed at the Warsaw Conference."
The court did recognize that one aspect of the treaty's history
bears directly on the issue of employee coverage. 8 The Hague Proto-
col,"9 a 1955 amendment to the Warsaw Convention never adopted by
the United States, 0 specifically provides in Article 14 ' that servants
and agents of the carrier are entitled to the liability limitation of the
Convention. The Reed court recognized that this amendment was
7 The defendants argued against an interpretation based solely on the text of
Article 22, citing Day as an example of liberal treaty construction. See Brief for Appel-
lants Wiser and Neuman at 15-19, Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
In Day, however, the treaty was liberally construed in light of its modern purposes to
allow injured passengers to recover, not to deny recovery as the defendants desired in
Reed. Contrary to the defendants' argument against treaty interpretation based
strictly on the text of the treaty, it is generally agreed that the plain language of the
text is the primary means of treaty construction. See note 30 supra. Since the goal of
interpretation is the determination of the drafters' intent as expressed in the text, see
note 30 supra, arguably the Reed court should have placed more emphasis on the
conspicuous absence of any reference to agents of the carrier in Article 22 and the
distinction between the corporate carrier and its agents in other articles of the Conven-
tion.
.' 414 F. Supp. at 867. For a discussion of the uses of preparatory materials in
treaty interpretation, see note 36 supra.
" The Hague Protocol is officially known as the Protocol to Amend the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, reprinted in LOWENFELD:
DOCUMENTs SUPPLEMENT supra note 1, at 425.
" The Protocol was never ratified by the Senate due to rising dissatisfaction with
the liability limitation of the Warsaw Convention. See note 79 supra. The Hague
Protocol raised the liability limitation to approximately $16,000, but this figure was
still far below average recoveries in comparable non-Warsaw cases. See note 6 supra.
See Lowenfeld & Mendelson, supra note 1, at 504-62, for a discussion of the Hague
Protocol and the refusal of the United States to adopt it.
Article 14 of the Hague Protocol provides in pertinent part:
(1) If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier
arising out of damage to which this Convention relates, such servant
or agent, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employ-
ment, shall be entitled to avail himself of the limits of liability which
the carrier himself is entitled to invoke under Article 22. ...
See note 79 supra. This express limitation of the liability of servants and agents is also
present in Article 11 of the Guatemala City Protocol. See note 62 supra.
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subject to more than one interpretation. 2 Article 14 of the Hague
Protocol could be construed merely as a clarification of the scope of
liability limitation as provided for in the original Convention.8 A
better interpretation, according to the Reed court, is that Article 14
of the Hague Protocol represents an express extension of liability
limitation to protect the airline's servants and agents who were sub-
ject to unlimited liability under the Warsaw Convention.
84
Having accepted the premise that the original Convention did not
provide for limited liability of employees, the Reed court implied that
the extension of liability limitation to airline employees was a reason
for the United States' rejection of the Protocol." In fact, however, the
debate in the United States over the Hague Protocol did not focus on
the status of air carrier employees, but rather on the general undesir-
ability of liability limitation for the growing airline industry. 6 By
suggesting reasons for the American rejection of the Protocol unre-
lated to those reasons which in fact resulted in the rejection, the Reed
court gave the impression that it was molding the history of the
Warsaw Convention to conform with the result it was trying to
achieve. To infer the purposes of a treaty simply from an analysis of
subsequent amendments which were rejected, as did the court in
' 414 F. Supp. at 867-68.
Id. at 867:
Al Id. at 867-68. Several delegates to the Hague Conference indicated that the
liability limitation provision of the original Convention did apply to servants and
agents of the air carrier. Id. at 867-68, n.17. Some delegates to the Hague Conference
stated their belief that the liability limitation provision of the Warsaw Convention did
not apply to employees of the air carrier. Id. at 868 n.18. However, an analysis of the
opinions of individual Convention delegates concerning the scope of the treaty forms
no part of the treaty interpretation process. See BROWNULE, supra note 17, at 604-11;
Vienna Convention, supra note 17, Art. 31-32. The goal of treaty interpretation is a
determination of the collective intent of the drafters and not their individual motives.
See note 30 supra. Arguably, the Reed court over-emphasized the statements of indi-
vidual delegates to the Warsaw and Hague Conferences concerning the scope of the
original Article 22. However, the court's conclusion that Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention does not limit the liability of airline employees is supported by the recom-
mendation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) made to the Hague
Conference concerning the revision of the original treaty. Documents of the Interna-
tional Conference on Private Air Law 2 ICAO Doc. No. 1686-LC/140, reprinted in Brief
for Appellee at 21, Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The ICAO
specifically recommended the extension of liability limitation to airline employees
because without such express limitation, under the original Convention suits could be
brought against employees indemnified by the carrier to hold the airline liable for
unlimited damages. Id. See text accompanying notes 96-99 infra.
414 F. Supp. at 868.
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 510.
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Reed, may well be misleading.
8
The Reed court also drew an analogy between the Warsaw Con-
vention and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act8 when discerning the
scope of Article 22.89 The Supreme Court, in Robert C. Herd & Co.
v. Krawill Machinery Corp.,9" construed the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act to exclude a negligent stevedore company acting as an agent of
the carrier from the Act's provisions of limited liability. The Court
in Herd held that since Congress knew of the common law liability
"' The interpretation of legislative intent from the rejection of past practices is
susceptible to a fallacy analogous to post hoc ergo propter hoc ("after this therefore
because of this"). The fact that a legislative body was familiar and displeased with
certain events is not necessarily an indication that particular legislation was designed
to eliminate those events. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONsTrruTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 121 (1975).
' 414 F. Supp. at 866. Section 1304(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970), provides for the limited liability of sea-going carriers of
goods in the event of loss or damage to the goods. The Act makes no specific mention
of the carrier's employees.
81 See note 51 supra for a discussion of a similar common law analogy asserted by
the plaintiffs in Day which was rejected by the Second Circuit.
359 U.S. 297 (1959).
gi Id. at 302. The Reed defendants attempted to distinguish Herd on the basis that
it dealt with the liability of a non-servant agent stevedore, while the facts of Reed
concerned the liability of employee-servants of the carrier. Reply Brief for Appellants
Wiser and Neuman, at 4-6, Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The
distinction between a servant and a non-servant agent is that the physical conduct of
a servant is subject to the control of the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
Introductory Note §§ 129-249 (1957). Although not clear in appellants' brief, presuma-
bly this asserted distinction between servants and non-servant agents was an attempt
to show that the references to "agents" in Articles 20(1) and 25(2), see notes 75-76
supra, were limited to non-servant agents and that no distinction was made between
the carrier and its servants anywhere in the Convention. Yet, by definition, all servants
are also agents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957). Thus, the references
to "agents" in Articles 20(1) and 25(2) could include servants as well as non-servant
agents of the carrier. The broad term "agents" in these articles indicates that the
corporate carrier was expressly distinguished from both its servants and non-servant
agents in at least some articles of the Convention. See text accompanying notes 75-76
supra. The Reed court also cited Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357,
384 (1873), and United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 242 (1952) for
the proposition that common carriers cannot stipulate against their own negligence or
that of their agents in the absence of specific congressional authority, 414 F. Supp. at
866. The Warsaw Convention, however, is not merely a stipulation of liability limita-
tion by the carriers, but rather a treaty which has been adopted as law in the United
States and therefore has the same effect as a congressional act limiting liability. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation de la
Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), which held that the Warsaw
Convention is the law of the land notwithstanding a strong public policy against the
limitation of liability. Id. at 145.
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of agents for all damages caused by their negligence, specific lan-
guage including employees within the liability limitation provisions
of the Act would have been used if an exception to the common law
rule had been intended.2 While such an analogy to a body of law
outside the Warsaw Convention is not a part of the treaty interpreta-
tion process,9 3 and therefore sheds no direct light on the meaning of
Article 22,1' it does illustrate the hostility of courts toward limitations
of liability.
Ultimately, the court in Reed, like the Day court, rested its deci-
sion on an analysis of the modem function of the Warsaw Convention.
The Reed court acknowledged that the primary purpose of the origi-
nal treaty was to limit the liability of airlines. 5 In addition the court
noted the possibility of airline liability insurance which extends cov-
erage to the employees of the airline. Many airlines, in fact, have
indemnification agreements with their employees, which provide that
the airline will satisfy any judgments rendered against the employ-
ees.97 In such cases, if the liability of airline employees was not lim-
ited, an injured passenger could effectively avoid the liability limita-
tion provisions of the Convention by suing the servants and agents
of the air carrier. 8 Article 22 of the original treaty sought to prevent
such unlimited liability.9 Yet, the Reed court repeatedly cited the
discussion in Day for the proposition that the original objectives of
the Convention have become obsolete and have been replaced by the
goal of increased protection for the airline passenger.' 9
If the welfare of the passenger is truly to be considered, then the
damages recovered for his injuries should come as close as possible
"5 See BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 605-09; Vienna Convention, supra note 17, Art.
31-2.
" The Reed court conceded that the analogy to American law was not controlling
in the interpretation of an international treaty. 414 F. Supp. at 866.
's Id. at 865.
" Id. See KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 12.02[3] at 12-4.
'7 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 12.02[3] at 12-4.
" The Reed court noted that the liability of the employee in suits brought by
injured passengers would be determined under the traditional rules of negligence, as
opposed to the provisions of absolute liability under the Montreal Agreement. 414 F.
Supp. at 867. Because of the difficulty of proving fault in many aircraft accident cases,
the traditional negligence standard would benefit the airline employees and the air-
lines which idemnify them. Hence the carriers are not completely stripped of protec-
tion by the result in Reed. Id. at 865.
See note 6 supra.
"' The Reed court cited Day for the premise that the original policy of the Warsaw
Convention has lost most of its persuasive force with the rise of modem international
airlines. 414 F. Supp. at 865.
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to full compensation."' A passenger with very serious injuries should
be afforded the same opportunity for complete compensation as a
passenger with relatively minor injuries.' °2 An effective liability limi-
tation provision, however, must by definition interfere with realistic
compensatory damages.10 3 Airlines want limited liability only when
the limit is lower than average actual damages.' Thus, in the inter-
ests of realistic compensation to injured plaintiffs, the provisions of
liability limitation in Article 22 of the Convention should be narrowly
construed, as in Reed, to exclude from its protection the servants and
agents of the air carrier.
The result in Reed is directly supported by Pierre v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc.' 5 In Pierre, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for
injuries sustained when the aircraft crashed on takeoff. The plaintiff
brought action against both the airline and the pilot of the aircraft.
The District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the liabil-
ity limitation of Article 22 does not extend to the servants and agents
of the air carrier.' 6 The court stated that this construction was indi-
cated by the United States' rejection of the Hague Protocol, which
specifically includes servants and agents of the carrier within the
ambit of its liability limitations provision.'0
The Reed court, in stating that there is a judicial division concern-
ing the scope of the Article 22 liability limitation provision, cited
Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines'5 as contrary to the result in
"I The imposition of a maximum limit on damages is a departure from the tradi-
tional American tort law principle that a tortfeasor should bear the full cost of the
damages which he causes. KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 11.01[4], at 11-7. Thus, in the
traditional personal injury or wrongful death case, courts strive to measure the mone-
tary equivalent of the injury suffered so that the plaintiff may be made whole. Id.
,02 Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, Symposium on the Warsaw
Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 528, 530 (1967).
"I Id. at 531.
104 Id.
1 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
'0 Id. at 488.
"' Id. at 489. See text accompanying note 93 supra. For a similar conclusion drawn
from the American rejection of the Hague Protocol by the Reed court, see 414 F. Supp.
at 868. But see note 87 supra. Similarly, a Canadian decision, Stratton v. Trans
Canada Air Lines, 27 D.L.R.2d 670 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd on other grounds, 32
D.L.R.2d 736 (B.C. Ct. App. 1962), held that the precise equivalent of Article 22 in
the Carriage by Air Act, CAN. Rav. STAT. c.45 (1952) which ratified the Convention on
behalf of Canada, does not limit the liability of the pilot of the crashed airplane in
which plaintiff's decedent was killed. 27 D.L.R.2d at 674. The Stratton court stated
only that there was no reason to believe that Article 22 applies to employees of the air
carrier. Id.
10 132 F. Supp. 611, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
WARSAW CONVENTION RECOVERY
Pierre.'9 Chutter involved injury to a passenger who, after boarding
the aircraft stepped out of the open rear door as the loading ramp was
being removed by the aviation service company. The injured passen-
ger brought suit against both the airline and the service company."'
Both defendants asserted that the suit was barred under Article
29(1)1" of the Warsaw Convention, which provides for a two-year
statute of limitations on all actions brought under the treaty. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
time limitation of Article 29(1) applies to agents of the carrier, as well
as to the corporate carrier itself."' The rationale of the Chutter deci-
sion was that the carrier, in delegating the function of ramp handling
to the service company, made the service company an agent which
performed a part of the contract of carriage."' The Chutter court
indicated that to distinguish the corporate entity from its many em-
ployees whose joint activities constitute the activity of the carrier was
impractical, and therefore the provisions of the Convention were held
to apply to agents of the carrier."'
The Chutter court relied on A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama
R.R.,"u9 decided under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,"6 wherein
the Fifth Circuit held that the liability of a stevedore, as an agent of
the carrier, was limited by the Act."7 The court based its holding on
the theory that the activity of the corporate carrier could not be
separated from the activities of its agents."' The rationale of Collins,
however, was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Robert
C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp."' The Court stated in
Herd that the liability of an agent for his own negligence is so funda-
mental to the law of torts that the limitation of such liability should
not be inferred in the absence of specific statutory language' to that
'"414 F. Supp. at 865.
110 132 F. Supp. at 612-13.
' Article 29(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought
within two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination,
or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from
the date on which the transportation stopped.
See note 1 supra.
,,1 132 F. Supp. at 613.
113 Id.
114 Id.
,, 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952).
"' See note 88 supra.
"' 197 F.2d at 897.
,' Id.
359 U.S. 297, 303-05 (1959).
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effect. 10 Hence, the practical effect of Herd was to weaken substan-
tially the authority of Chutter, thereby leaving Pierre'"' as solid pre-
cedent for Reed. The Second Circuit in Reed, like the Supreme Court
in Herd, based its decision on the fundamental premise that tort
victims should be allowed to recover fully for their injuries whenever
possible.'
This concern with the protection of the airline passenger links the
decisions in Day and Reed. The two cases illustrate the general trend,
especially evident in the Second Circuit, toward construction of the
Warsaw Convention in such a manner as to maximize the recovery
of injured passengers. In order to permit recovery, courts must some-
times interpret the Convention liberally, as did the Second Circuit
in Day. In other cases such as Reed, courts must construe the lan-
guage of the treaty narrowly in order for an injured passenger to
receive full compensation. The Second Circuit heard oral arguments
in Reed on November 22, 1976. The court should continue to construe
the Convention in favor of passengers by affirming the decision of the
lower court.
W. FAIN RUTHERFORD, JR.
12 Id.
121 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
'2 414 F. Supp. at 865.
